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Keynes and the Birth of Modern Macroeconomics1
          by
    David Laidler
Abstract: The usual description of Keynes’s macroeconomics as relying on the postulate of
money wage stickiness to explain unemployment, and advocating fiscal policy as its cure, is
largely mythical. Rather he was concerned with exploring the theoretical idea that an economy
co-ordinated by monetary exchange is prone to market failures that create unemployment. The
origins of this idea in what Keynes’ called “classical” economics can be traced back at least as
far as John Stuart Mill, though he himself preferred to claim the much less orthodox Malthus as
his antecedent. Be that as it may, Keynes’s own emphasis on income and employment variations
as the both the result of and the “solution” to specifically inter-temporal failures was highly
original. The idea that monetary exchange might involve co-ordination failures of any sort has
now largely disappeared from macroeconomics, under the influence of New-classical economics. 
Keywords: macroeconomics, Keynesian economics, markets, money, interest rates,        
unemployment, multiplier.. 
JEL Classification: B12, B22, B31.
2I  -  Keynes and Macroeconomics
Keynes’s (1936) General Theory of Employment, Interest and Money was about the role of the
monetary system in general, and the rate of interest in particular, in causing the overall level of
employment in a market economy to fall short of its full potential. A sub-set of its ideas were
systematised by a younger generation of economists and introduced to the textbooks, just as the
word macroeconomics began to be widely used to distinguish the analysis of  the economy as a
whole from microeconomics which dealt with individual households, firms or even industries.
Not without justification, macroeconomics soon became a synonym for Keynesian economics;
and in the late1970s, when the influence of Keynes’s specific ideas on the sub-discipline had
long since waned, he was still commonly credited with having founded it. (Lucas and Sargent,
1978)
II  -   Myths about Keynes and the Classics
Myth-making about Keynes’s role in the creation of modern macro-economics began with his
own 1936 account of the work of his predecessors and older contemporaries, to whom he affixed
the blanket label the Classical Economists.  He attributed a fundamental weakness to their
economic theory: namely, that it encompassed the postulate - known as Say’s Law - that an
economy-wide excess supply of output and therefore of labour was a logical impossibility, and
that it was incapable of explaining economy-wide unemployment. 
Keynes’ account of Classical economics was a caricature, but most of his interpreters
accepted it, and supplemented it with distortions of his own work to produce a myth about the
development of macroeconomics that still dominates many economists’ beliefs. In this myth,
Classical economics argued that, if more people sought work than there were jobs available, a
fall in wages would not only suffice to restore full employment, but would in fact occur. The
relevant wage was the real wage, the nominal wage adjusted for variations in the purchasing
power of the money in terms of which it was actually set, but, so the myth continued, the
Classical economists had failed to notice that, in the modern world, a wide variety of contractual
rigidities prevented nominal wages from falling in the face of an excess supply of labour.
Keynes, however, did notice this, deduced that real wages could therefore not be relied on to
adjust according to Classical principles. He proposed that, in these circumstances, the
government should fight unemployment by increasing its own spending on goods and services,
and perhaps by cutting taxes to encourage households to increase their spending, and should be
prepared to run budget deficits to finance such measures.
According to this myth, then, Keynes’s originality in 1936  lay first in recognising that
the labour market was subject to wage rigidities that other economists had overlooked; and
second in proposing that unemployment resulting from these rigidities be dealt with by an active
program of deficit spending by governments. This simple tale is implausible. It is unlikely that
economists, whose discipline had existed since at least the second half of the 18th century, had
failed to notice so salient a feature of labour markets as wage stickiness in the intervening years,
3and it is hard to see, for example, where the first Roosevelt administration’s New Deal could
have come from, if Keynes was not to invent expansionary fiscal policy until1936. Finally, if this
is nevertheless what Keynes’ book was really about, why did he not give it some such title as
Employment, Wages and Fiscal Policy? After all, the above account credits it with only
superficial theoretical content, and mentions neither interest nor money at all.
III  -  Say’s Law and Money
Keynes’s caricature of Classical economics nevertheless captured certain salient features of its
subject. For a century after the publication of the Wealth of Nations, (Smith 1776) its centrepiece
was a theory of economic growth that was indeed underpinned by a version of Say’s Law. Smith
had argued that income not spent by landowners and capitalists on consumption, and hence
saved, would be channelled into supporting labour in the production of goods for future
consumption, and that, therefore, there would be no chance of output going to waste. With
certain qualifications having to do with the production of machinery, David Ricardo (1817,
1821) also subscribed to this view. More generally, he also argued that, though goods were not
bartered, but bought and sold in exchange for money,  monetary exchange was purely an
intermediate activity that did not alter the essential nature of market activity, namely that it was
goods and services that ultimately bought goods and services, so that a general oversupply of
them, and hence of labour, was impossible.
Ricardo, however, wrote in the second decade of the 19th century, a period marked by
unemployment and social unrest, and some commentators, notably his friend Thomas Malthus
(1820), attributed these problem to a flaw in the mechanisms of economic growth that somehow
caused rapid capital accumulation and output growth to outrun the capacity of effective demand
to absorb it, leading to a general glut of commodities on the market. Ricardo’s counter-argument
to this, namely that unemployment reflected a mis-allocation of labour among industries brought
about by post-war changes in the structure of demand, and would in due course be cured by an
adjustment of relative prices, is generally judged to have carried this debate, but the dissenting
position never quite died out, subsequently enabling Keynes to claim - whether accurately or not
is another matter, though Steven Kates (1994) mounts a strong defence of  Keynes’s claim - that
his General Theory was but the latest, but finally a logically coherent, manifestation of it.
Had there been no more to Classical economics than the views expressed in Ricardo’s
Principles, there would be much to be said for Keynes’s 1936 critique. However it also
encompassed a more pragmatic literature, dealing with cyclical economic instability, which has a
strong claim to be treated as the true antecedent of modern macroeconomics, and to which,
incidentally, Ricardo was also an early contributor. It was in this context that John Stuart Mill
(1844,1848) pointed to an essential role for money in qualifying Say’s law as it was generally
understood, explicitly connecting his insights to the Malthus-Ricardo debate. Mill re-affirmed
the impossibility of excessive capital accumulation creating a general glut of output, but noted
that the proposition that agents would always bring goods and services to market with a view to
buying other goods and services was true of logical necessity only in an economy where trade
2This is not a claim that the Marshalls originated the idea of wage stickiness. It had
appeared on and off in earlier literature, notably Henry Thornton (1802), but the Marshalls do
seem to have been the first to deplpy it in the specific context of cyclical variations in
unemployment.
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was by barter. Under monetary exchange, agents might sometimes try to sell goods to acquire
money for its own sake, and when they did, there would be a general over-supply of goods on
the market relative to money. 
Mill associated such behaviour with financial crises. He thought that a desire to
accumulate cash at such times was a reaction to acute uncertainty about the near-term future, and
would be short-lived; and he did not make any more of his insights than this. But those insights
were nevertheless of profound theoretical importance: they suggested that markets where
exchange was mediated by money could sometimes behave in ways that would be impossible
under barter, and that such behaviour stemmed from the uncertainty to which economic activity
co-ordinated by monetary exchange was subject. In short, they suggested that monetary
exchange was anything but an inessential feature of the economy. Much generalised and their
potential implications worked out in great detail, these insights would ultimately inform the
General Theory.  
IV  -   Money Wage Stickiness 
Even so, when Mill’s successors began to study unemployment, they did not directly associate it
with the efforts of agents to build up their money-holdings, but began to rely instead on nominal
wage stickiness. Following Alfred Marshall and Mary Marshall (1879), it was often argued that,
when, over the course of the cycle, the price level rose and fell, money wages would follow only
sluggishly, so that real wages would fall and rise, inducing fluctuations in the demand for labour
and therefore employment.2 Post-1936 myths were thus badly wrong to suggest that nominal
wage stickiness as an explanation of unemployment was original to Keynes. On the contrary,  in
1936 he pointed to a serious logical incompleteness in the above argument, which seemed to
imply that the implementation of nominal wage cuts, a policy to which he had been strongly
opposed from the mid-1920s onwards, were a sure cure for unemployment. 
This incompleteness arose because the argument assumed that the demand for labour
varied inversely with the real wage, a relationship that would hold for an individual firm, or even
a single industry, but not necessarily for the economy as a whole. Here, a sequence of effects
running from fluctuations in employment to incomes, from incomes to expenditure, and from
expenditure to the demand for labour and hence back to employment, had to be taken into
account. In fact, Keynes asserted, there might be no way to restoring full employment to an
economy by money wage cuts. Their implementation might set in motion a downward spiral of 
wages and prices, with no well-determined effect on quantities. He treated this last conclusion as
a logical possibility, however,  not a necessity, because, as we shall now see, he did recognise
3Here Keynes overstated his own originality. The concept of effective demand, and the
term itself, was central to Ralph Hawtrey’s discussions of cyclical fluctuations from (1913)
onwards. He developed a special case of the analysis which Keynes would present as novel in
(1936). On this, see David Laidler (1999) 
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the existence of a mechanism whereby money wage cuts, whether market or policy induced,
might indeed cause employment to rise.
An essential component of Keynes’s (1936) theory was that employment depended on
the economy-wide demand for labour, which in turn depended on effective demand, the economy
wide volume of expenditure on goods and services. He claimed that this insight had informed
Malthus’ theory of the general glut, but that the concept of effective demand had been lost sight
of in the wake of Ricardo’s victory in their debate, only now to be rediscovered by himself. He
argued that money wage cuts might cure unemployment,  not because they would lead to lower
real wages, but because they might increase in effective demand.3  Such cuts would reduce
firms’ costs, enabling them to reduce prices, hence causing the general price level to fall. If the
stock of nominal money in circulation was held constant as this happened, then its real
purchasing power would increase, agents would find their money holdings excessive, their
expenditure on goods and services would go up, and employment would therefore increase; and
this would happen even though downward pressure on prices would tend to mute any direct
effects on real wages. 
Where the Marshalls and their successors had explained unemployment as the
consequence of money wage stickiness in the face of falling prices, then, Keynes stressed that a
failure of prices to fall induced by money wage stickiness could force output and employment
(rather than the price level) to bear the burden of adjustment to a discrepancy between the supply
and demand for money. He noted that wage cuts might, therefore, help to reduce unemployment,
but he presented this effect as an unreliable one on which any case for attempting to reduce
unemployment by inducing money wage cuts would nevertheless have to rely. It might, for
example, be overwhelmed by depressing expectational effects on effective demand,  associated
with a falling (as opposed to a lower) price level, and it might be short-circuited by a monetary
policy regime that permitted the nominal money supply to contract as the price level fell.
Furthermore, in Keynes’s view, the experience of the United States in the early years of the
Depression, when the price level fell dramatically, ruled out wage-price stickiness as a plausible
explanation of the occurrence of large-scale unemployment, and wage cuts as a reliable cure for
it. 
Keynes concluded that increasing the supply of money was a better remedy for
unemployment than money wage cuts, but he had little more enthusiasm for this alternative.
Rather, he argued that the causes of unemployment lay deeper in the mechanisms of monetary
exchange than the effects of wage and price frictions on the workings of markets for currently
produced goods and services, and that neither wage flexibility nor simple monetary measures
would reliably counter them.
4The potential incompatibility of these two concepts of the natural rate gave rise to much
discussion in the 1920s and 1930s. See Laidler 1999, Part 2, for a discussion of this matter,
which is of marginal importance in the current context. 
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V -  Saving and Investment, Uncertainty and the Monetary System
When Adam Smith (1776) argued that a decision to abstain from current consumption (to save)
was simultaneously a decision to employ labour in the production of goods for future
consumption (and hence to invest), he was thinking of a choice made by an individual capitalist
about the allocation over time of his own income. By Keynes’s time, however, it had been a
commonplace for more than a century that saving and investment decisions were  typically made
by different agents, and that the co-ordination of their choices about the inter-temporal allocation
of resources was a task for the capital market, in which the relevant equilibrating price was the
rate of interest. By then too, it had long been agreed that the rate of interest that investors were
willing to pay for borrowed funds derived from their expectations about the profitability of the
investments that they intended to make, and that the rate that lenders demanded depended upon
their assessment of the sacrifices involved in deferring current consumption into the future.
Within this broad consensus, however, the Classical literature accommodated many important
variations in the its treatment of the interactions of saving and investment. One of these -
felicitously called The Wicksell Connection by Axel Leijonhufvud (1981) - focussed on the role
of the monetary system in these matters, and is worth particular attention at this point.
Gold coinage and notes convertible into gold played a subordinate role in the late 19th
century monetary system. It was dominated by commercial banks whose lending created, as a
by-product, deposits that were then used as a means of exchange. Of course, the role of banks in
the monetary system had been much discussed throughout the century, but Knut Wicksell’s
Interest and Prices (1898) brought a new element to its analysis. Instead of concentrating on
banks’ capacity to create means of exchange per se, he focussed on the effects on prices of the
rate of interest at which they made loans, the market rate, and its interaction with the natural
rate, which he usually identified with the rate of interest which would equilibrate the savings and
investment at a full employment level of output, and sometimes with the marginal productivity
of capital.4  
The banking system, Wicksell saw, was capable of keeping the market rate of interest
away from the natural rate because of its capacity to create and destroy credit, and hence induce
variations in the rate of flow of lending in the capital market that were independent of the
economy’s underlying saving rate. For him, the main point was that any discrepancy between
these rates would have inflationary or deflationary consequences for the price level. By the
1920s, however, Wicksell’s successors were beginning to stress that, if the actions of the banks
7in creating and destroying credit could prevent the rate of interest settling at its natural level, a
monetary economy could offer no guarantee that decisions about saving would always and
automatically be translated into matching decisions about investment, that Say’s law would thus
be violated, and that things perhaps could go badly wrong on the employment front.
 In his (1930) Treatise on Money Keynes tried to create a theory of the business cycle
partly, but explicitly, grounded in Wicksell’s analysis. His basic thesis was that cyclical
fluctuations stemmed from swings in investment that were in turn driven by variations in
investors’ perceptions of the profitability of investment. In times of optimism, the natural rate of
interest rose, and in times of pessimism it fell, and the market rate of interest failed to keep up
with its fluctuations. Even in the Treatise,  Keynes’s discussions of investors’ perceptions
stressed that they were influenced as much by psychology as by rational calculation, but he
pushed this theme further in the General Theory, where he argued explicitly that investment was
dominated by what he called  “animal spirits”. Though investors might act with a view to
maximising the present value of an expected flow of profits, and to that extent act rationally, the
expectations on which they had to base their decisions, each one of which was likely to have
unique features, could rely only to a very limited extent on hard information about their likely
outcomes. Hence the calculus of probabilities could not be applied to the analysis of investment
decisions, and they were bound to be dominated by psychology. 
Some commentators trace Keynes views on investment to ideas about fundamental
uncertainty that he developed in his (1921) Treatise on Probability. However, as Bradley
Bateman (1996) has noted, Keynes downplayed the importance of uncertainty in economic life
in many of his writings in the 1920s, so this link is at best indirect. It is just as likely that
Keynes’s 1936 view of investment derived from the earlier work of his Cambridge colleagues,
notably Arthur Pigou and Frederick Lavington, for as both Bateman and Laidler (1999) have
pointed out, they raised such issues in the explicit context of business cycle theory in (1912) and
(1922) respectively. They had argued that the longer the horizon of any investment decision,  the
more prone to error did it become, and that errors of optimism and pessimism alike would be
correlated across agents, and have market consequences which caused them to feed on
themselves over time. Thus, they had postulated that successive waves of optimism and
pessimism underlay the business cycle, in a manner that to some extent anticipated Keynes’s
treatment in the Treatise, albeit without the latter’s explicitly Wicksellian monetary apparatus.
The discussion of investment in the General Theory is supplemented by a lengthy and
justly famous account of why the characteristics of modern financial markets make the problems
to which the foregoing arguments point worse rather than better. According to this account,
access to markets in which shares may be actively and easily traded, in which there exists
considerable liquidity, enables agents to make their savings available for investment without
simultaneously having to tie them up for long periods in specific projects. Though this might
encourage savings, it also ensures that short-term prospects for gains and losses in financial
markets will come to dominate decisions about how to hold existing wealth, and how to allocate
new saving, thus ensuring that these choices remain disconnected from any careful assessment of
the long term prospects for particular investment projects
8Keynes’s theory of liquidity preference was also developed in the Treatise before being
given a crucial role in the General Theory, and is closely related to his scepticism about the
capacity of financial markets to co-ordinate saving and investment in a world characterised by
uncertainty. Alfred Marshall (1871) had argued that agents desire to keep by them a certain stock
of money, which represents readily available and general purchasing power, in order to facilitate
their transactions in markets for goods and services, and so matters had stood in Cambridge
monetary theory until Lavington (1921) suggested that they might also hold money as a
protection against the uncertainties to which their participation in financial markets exposed
them. Keynes developed this insight in the Treatise, when he dealt with what he called the
financial circulation. Specifically, he related changes the amount of money that agents would
want to hold for speculative (here I use the vocabulary of the General Theory) purposes to their
swings between moods of pessimism and optimism. In times of pessimism, investment would
shrink, and savers would simultaneously build up money holdings in the financial circulation.
When optimism returned,  investment would pick up, and some of the funds needed to finance it
would simultaneously be released from the financial circulation into the industrial circulation,
where they would circulate in exchange for currently produced output. Crucially, these monetary
movements would dampen the very swings in the market rate of interest needed to match those
in the natural rate induced by successive waves of optimism and pessimism, and hence interfere
with the mechanisms whereby investment might be kept in harmony with the economy’s
underlying saving rate. 
This analysis too was pushed further in the General Theory. There, Keynes argued that
agents always have the option of holding money as a store of wealth, and that money, being  the
economy’s means of exchange and hence the most liquid (easily marketed) of all assets, they
would demand a premium in order to part with it. Hence, the very presence of money in the
economic system put a positive floor under the rate of interest, so that when investors “animal
spirits” were depressed, it could not fall low enough to generate the volume of investment
needed to absorb the economy’s full-employment level of savings. 
VI  -  The Multiplier
The General Theory was by no means the first work to argue that: (a) the co-ordination of saving
and investment at full employment by the rate of interest  might break down because of the
working on the monetary system; and that (b) this breakdown would likely result in
unemployment. Earlier work, however, had failed to explain just how (b) in fact followed from
(a). For example, the Treatise on Money itself had presented many verbal arguments about why
output and employment might fluctuate as waves of optimism and pessimism caused the natural
rate of interest to move away from the market rate, but that book’s underlying theoretical
framework nevertheless yielded cycles only in prices. That was because, as Keynes’s younger
colleagues at Cambridge had been quick to point out, the framework had implicitly assumed
output and employment to be constant. In the General Theory, Keynes filled this gaping hole in
his previous analysis with the multiplier, a mechanism which he did not originate, but for which
he found a new and profoundly important theoretical use.
5 Keynes referred only to Kahn the General Theory. Warming’s paper appeared in the
Economic Journal, of which Keynes was editor, so it is hard to believe that he was unaware of it,
as Neville Cain (1979) pointed out.
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The idea that cumulative spillovers among  firms, industries and even sectors of the
economy, might be a feature of economy-wide variations in output and employment made
sporadic  appearances in Classical economics from the late19th century onwards, and attracted
increasing attention the 1920s, when the likely effectiveness of using variations in government
spending on public works as a countermeasure to unemployment was frequently debated. The
analysis of spillover effects remained disturbingly vague, however, inviting ridicule even from
staunch supporters of the policies themselves. Pigou, for example, was still suggesting as late as
(1933) that some arguments seemed to imply that, were the government to spend but one extra
pound on increasing employment, that sum would be spent and re-spent in a never ending
sequence until full employment had been achieved.   
Richard Kahn, Keynes’s younger colleague and sometime student, had already played a
prominent role in criticising the theoretical structure of the Treatise, and it was he who finally
put the analysis of spillovers onto a firm foundation and simultaneously disposed of this reductio
ad absurdum. In (1931) he suggested that there would be leakages at each step in the sequence of
expenditures: only a fraction of any injection of funds aimed at putting the unemployed to work
would be re-spent by its recipients in ways that would put others to work, only a fraction of this
already reduced amount would be spent at the next round, and so on.  The effects on employment
of the initial expenditure would certainly be multiplied by spillovers, therefore, but the
multiplying factor would be finite, its size varying inversely with fraction of expenditure that
leaked away at each stage of the process. 
Kahn analysed the creation of employment, and emphasised leakages from the multiplier
sequence that arose because the government would no longer be obliged to pay unemployment
relief (the dole) to newly employed workers, and because some of the expenditures of the latter
would be directed at imports rather than domestic production. It was left to the Danish economist
Jens Warming (1932) to restate the basic argument in the form in which Keynes would then use
it.5 Warming suggested that the multiplier was better understood if formulated in terms of
income rather than employment, because the critical leakages in the process were not those that
Kahn had emphasised, but rather arose from the tendency of households to save a fraction of any
income they received, an issue that Kahn had only touched on. For example, said Warming, if
households saved 25 per cent of any increment to their income, and if this was the only leakage
from the system, then the multiplier process would result in any new injection of government
expenditure creating an increase in the economy’s output four times bigger than that injection.
The emphasis on saving in Warming’s version of the multiplier process was crucial in
enabling Keynes to bring together his ideas about the instability of investment behaviour and its
dependence on animal sprits, and about the role of uncertainty in creating liquidity preference,
the key ingredients of his case for the failure of Say’s law to apply in a monetary economy, into
6Friedrich von Hayek (1931) and Lionel Robbins (1934) are key expositions of Austrian
theory, which is discussed in more detail in Laidler (1999).   
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a coherent account of how, nevertheless, such an economy coped with the problem of co-
ordinating savings and investment. If households saved a stable fraction of any increment to their
income, then a fall in investment spending would set in motion a downward multiplier process
that would continue until income had contracted sufficiently to ensure that savings once again
just matched investment.  
Thus, the central theoretical revelation of the General Theory was that, in a money
economy, variations in income and employment, not in the rate of interest, are the primary factor
co-ordinating saving and investment.  At the same time, there seemed to be no reason why the
level of investment would, except by chance, be sufficient to require the volume of savings that
the economy would generate at full employment. Indeed, in mature economies such as Keynes
took those of Europe and the United States to be in the 1930s, the availability of profitable
investment projects was bound to be low and shrinking, animal spirits were likely to be
permanently depressed, effective demand would  fall short of the economy’s capacity to produce
goods and services, unemployment would be chronic, and far from being a symptom of some
kind of disequilibrium soon to be eliminated by market forces, it would also be an equilibrium
phenomenon.  
Keynes’s policy recommendations, which he developed only briefly, followed
immediately: it was the role of government to fill, with its own expenditure, the gap between the
level of investment required to generate full employment and that which animal spirits alone
would induce. There was nothing new about recommending increased public expenditures
in1936, but the foundation that Keynes provided for this advice, embedded as it was in a new
theory that challenged the relevance of Say’s Law to the workings of a monetary economy, was
of the highest originality.     
VII  - The Success and Simplification of Keynesian Macroeconomics
The General Theory’s rapid success owed much to the intellectual support it provided for an
already popular approach to policy. In the early 1930s, another explanation of the economic
troubles of the times, also grounded in an analysis of the workings of the monetary system that
derived from Wicksell, had begun to capture many imaginations. But Austrian theory, as it was
known, yielded nihilistic policy conclusions.6  It argued that credit creation by the banking
system enabled firms to command the production of investment goods without any voluntary act
of saving on the part of households, that this command could only be sustained at the cost of
ever-rising inflation, and that when the process came to its inevitable end in economic crisis, the
economy would be burdened with stocks of unfinished capital equipment and hence unable to
satisfy the demand for consumption goods. This imbalance could only be righted over time by
labour force growth and depreciation of the capital stock. Any attempts by activist governments
11
to hurry matters along would be destructive. Expansionary monetary impulses had caused the
problem in the first place, so more of the same was the last thing needed; the capital stock was
already over-expanded, so government sponsored investment would worsen the situation; and
there was no point in taking measures to stimulate consumption expenditure when the economy
was already unable to meet existing demands.               
It is easy enough nowadays to find theoretical weaknesses in this Austrian story, most of
which stem from its protagonists’ tendency to treat logical possibilities as if they were logical
necessities, but it was based on apparently rigorous economic theory (by the standards of its
time) and it also provided intellectual respectability to arguments for a “hands-off” policy
towards the Depression that were extremely popular in the financial community, and
conservative political circles more generally, on both sides of the Atlantic. For economists who
also wished to be policy activists, therefore, the arrival of Keynes’s alternative theoretical vision
was an event of singular importance, and it quickly drove Austrian ideas into professional
obscurity.
Another factor contributed to the success of Keynes’s analysis, however: namely, that its
essential properties seemed capable of formal expression in terms that were only a very little
more difficult to grasp than supply and demand analysis. The simplifications that enabled its
message to be so expressed, though they had Keynes’s own sanction, nevertheless distracted
attention from the key role that the General Theory attributed to the facts of monetary exchange
and their consequences for the economic system’s behaviour, and they helped to ensure that
macroeconomics began to lose sight of this essential feature of his contribution, as we shall now
see. 
Underlying Keynes’s analysis of the role of money in disrupting the co-ordination of
saving and investment by the interest rate were informational problems associated with the
simple fact that economic activity takes place over time and that actions have to be based on
expectations. Before 1936, many, including himself in the Treatise on Money, had treated the
evolution of expectations as integral to the processes generating cyclical swings in
unemployment, and the passage of time was thus always a central feature of their discussions,
but a formal treatment of these matters was prevented by the lack of a technical apparatus that
was up to the task. In 1936 Keynes dealt with this problem by resorting to a ruthless
simplification: he divided expectations into two categories: short-term, and long term, and then
proceeded “as if” the former were always fulfilled, and the latter exogenous. In so doing, he
created a manageable framework for analysing how an economy in which choices were co-
ordinated by output changes rather than price-level or interest rate movements would respond to
various shocks  
But, paradoxically, that analytic framework now abstracted from the passage of time, and
hence from any raison d’etre for the very phenomena that were in the first place responsible for
output changes rather than interest rate movements being at the heart of a monetary economy’s
co-ordination mechanisms. It thus only partially encompassed the ideas of the General Theory,
but because it  proved amenable to algebraic and geometric expression in the form of the so-
7The best single account of the process whereby “Keynesian Economics” came to be
encapsulated in the so-called IS-LM model is Warren Young (1987). The discussion that follows
here is partly based on Roger Backhouse and Laidler (2004, forthcoming)
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called IS-LM (investment = saving, liquidity preference =  money stock) model, it in due course
became the workhorse of the textbooks.7  IS-LM could be used to demonstrate some of Keynes’s
key conclusions: depressed “animal spirits” would lead to a low level of income and
employment; monetary policy could offset this only to the extent that the interest rate could be
driven down; a fiscal response would be more reliable; etc. But the reasons why the equations of
the system took the forms needed to produce such results could not be developed within it, and
other forms seemed just as admissible. 
Some of these alternatives, moreover, yielded very “Classical” results, in the sense of
showing that Say’s law might hold after all, even in the presence of money. The best known of
these alternatives, developed in various degrees of detail by Gottfried von Haberler (1937),
Pigou (1943) and Don Patinkin (1948) among others, involves the system’s properties when it is
postulated that (a) the price level will fall if the level of income is below full employment, (b)
the nominal supply of money is given, and (c) expenditure increases with the real purchasing
power of that given nominal money supply. On these assumptions, for a given level of “animal
spirits” and degree of liquidity preference, and with any possibility for expectations to respond to
falling prices eliminated by assumption, the system’s only equilibrium is at full employment.
Hence it appears to show that there is no fundamental “flaw” in the workings of the market
economy. But what this result really demonstrates is that if a model abstracts from the fact that
economic activity takes place in real time, and hence from all the forces which make monetary
exchange essential in any actual economy, it will also abstract from the factors the can cause
Say’s law to fail.
As a critique of Keynes’s contribution to macroeconomic analysis, this is hardly an earth-
shattering result, then, useful though it is in confirming his insights about just where the
fundamental monetary problems he thought worthy of his attention reside; but it was precisely
this result that yielded the myth - once termed a “useful fiction” by Paul Samuelson -  that
Keynes’s explanation of unemployment relied on the assumption of money wage stickiness;
more important, it provided a basis for the belief, widely held even among those who have taken
the trouble to read the General Theory, that even though Keynes had indeed claimed that wage
stickiness was irrelevant, he had been mistaken to do so.  Small wonder that Keynes’s radical
younger colleague Joan Robinson would refer to the IS-LM model as “Bastard Keynesianism”,
or that, in (1968) Leijonhufvud would draw a clear distinction between Keynesian Economics
and the Economics of Keynes, and argue that macroeconomics would do well to abandon the
former and begin to rebuild itself on a foundation drawn from the latter.
      
8Friedman and Schwartz’s treatment of the Depression in the US resembles that of
Lauchlin Currie (1934), which was, as he acknowledged, influenced by Hawtrey’s cycle theory.
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VIII  -  Monetarism and After
Leijonhufvud’ s plea was to be ineffective. Instead, the monetarist counter-revolution would take
centre stage, not least because by the 1970s, inflation was emerging as the central problem
facing market economies everywhere, and because monetarism was every bit as much devoted to
the economics of inflation as the General Theory had been to the economics of depression. Even
so, two other books of Keynes’s, namely his (1923) A Tract on Monetary Reform and (1940)
How to Pay for the War exerted a direct influence on monetarism’s early evolution. In both of
them, Keynes made a vigorous case for price level stability as a necessary condition for the
smooth functioning of a fully-employed market economy, and argued that if the money supply
was expanded at a rate significantly in excess of the economy’s potential rate of real growth,
inflation would result. But he also explained that fiscally hard pressed governments might
nevertheless be driven to print money as a means of balancing their budgets. These arguments
had considerable resonance when inflation became a pressing policy problem in the 1960s and
1970s, and the monetarists paid attention to these other books of Keynes’s, particularly the
Tract. 
How to Pay for the War had also had an indirect influence on Milton Friedman’s work in
the 1940s. In it, Keynes argued that, with the onset of war, Britain’s problem was no longer to
find employment for surplus resources, but to choose among alternative uses for scarce ones.
The requirements of the war had created an inflationary gap between the economy’s demand for
goods and services and its capacity to produce them. Britain’s 1941 budget was based on
Keynes’s analysis of how to bridge that gap without resort to the printing press, and its ideas
made a considerable impression Friedman, who, without being aware of their origins in Keynes’s
work, gave them great play in his first two articles on inflation (1943, 1942 rev.1953)
The eclipse of Keynes’s (1936) ideas by monetarism in the 1960s and 1970s was only
partly due to a change in the prevailing economic climate, for Friedman and Anna Schwartz’s
Monetary History of the United States (1963) challenged some of them on their own ground, and
persuasively so too. In Keynes’s view, the Depression in the United States had begun with a
collapse of animal spirits, and had persisted because investment opportunities remained limited
in a maturing economy; falling wages and prices had not prevented the economy’s collapse, nor
had, or could, expansionary monetary policy, because it could not drive the rate of interest low
enough to revive investment: hence the case for fiscal policy as a means to sustained recovery.
For Friedman and Schwartz, on the other hand, the Depression was mainly a matter of ill-
conceived monetary policy: after an initial downturn, perhaps itself caused by a mild monetary
tightening, adjustments to wages and prices had failed to restore output and employment because
the quantity of money had then collapsed in the face of a series of preventable bank failures.
Output had barely responded to expansionary monetary policy when it was tried, notably in
1932, because it had not been expansionary enough.8  
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This re-interpretation of the Great Depression was supported by copious empirical
evidence, and it implied a deeply conservative message, quite contrary to that of The General
Theory: namely, that the Depression provided no evidence that mechanisms inherent in a
monetary economy required that it be subjected to continuous and rather large scale government
intervention. Such an economy was reliably self-regulating so long as monetary policy makers
refrained from creating chronic excess demands or supplies of money. In either circumstances,
Say’s law might be violated - along the lines that Mill had hinted at in 1844, it might be noted -
as friction-prone markets tried to eliminate the excesses in question, but there was no reason to
follow Keynes in arguing that, in a monetary economy, the inter-temporal co-ordination
mechanism was chronically prone to failure.
 
This argument of Friedman and Schwartz it proved extremely influential, but Monetarism
was soon to cede its important place in macroeconomics to New-classical economics, (see, eg..
Lucas and Sargent 1978), with whose advent, the last vestiges of Keynes’s economics would
disappear from the area’s mainstream. Initially, New-classical economics seemed  to be no more
than a mathematically rigorous restatement of monetarism, but. though it supported the same
conservative policy stance, it also introduced two new and radical theoretical doctrines. First, the
rational expectations idea had it that agents’ expectations about the future should be treated  “as
if” based on as much knowledge of the structure of the economy and the time series properties of
the shocks impinging upon it as was available to the economist building the model used to
analyse their behaviour. Second, the notion of market clearing required that such models should
assume that supply and demand were kept continuously equal to one another in all markets. 
Within New-classical economics, therefore, fundamental uncertainty, failures of Say’s
law, and the factors differentiating money and barter economies were ruled irrelevant by
methodological fiat, and  macroeconomics became completely detached from the ideas that had
formed the subject of Keynes’s General Theory, and unable, even unwilling, to discuss them.
Ironically, it took on the very features that Keynes had so unfairly attributed to Classical
economics, prior to criticising it. At the time of writing, New-classical economics is under
challenge from a body of work (see, eg. Michael Woodford 2003) whose main differentiating
characteristic is the deployment of money-wage and price stickiness postulates. This new body
of work has therefore done nothing to move macroeconomics back towards analysing the
theoretical issues that were central to it when it emerged as a distinct sub-discipline; indeed the
universal acceptance of its self-adopted label - New Keynesian economics - suggests that
contemporary macroeconomics has now forgotten what those issue were.   
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